President Trump Backs Down From Tariff Threat After US and Mexico Reach Agreement

The United States and Mexico appear to have reached an agreement on the current immigration crisis which will avert the harsh and draconian tariffs that President Donald Trump threatened to levy on all Mexican imports.

President Trump announced the agreement in two tweets:

“I am pleased to inform you that The United States of America has reached a signed agreement with Mexico. The Tariffs scheduled to be implemented by the U.S. on Monday, against Mexico, are hereby indefinitely suspended. Mexico, in turn, has agreed to take strong measures to … stem the tide of Migration through Mexico, and to our Southern Border. This is being done to greatly reduce, or eliminate, Illegal Immigration coming from Mexico and into the United States. Details of the agreement will be released shortly by the State Department. Thank you!”

In a press statement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo thanked his Mexican counterpart, Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard. “The United States looks forward to working alongside Mexico to fulfill these commitments so that we can stem the tide of illegal migration across our southern border and to make our border strong and secure,” said Secretary Pompeo.

Minister Ebrard appeared to be pleased with the agreement. In a tweet, he thanked Secretary Pompeo “for his valuable participation in achieving today’s agreement with the US.”

President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador also voiced his support for the arrangement in a tweet.

In a media note from the Department of State, the US and Mexican governments agreed to “work together to immediately implement a durable solution” and to crack down on “irregular migration” in their countries.

Mexico agreed to beef up immigration enforcement. Under the agreement, the National Guard will be deployed Mexico’s southern border and throughout the country. Mexico also agreed to allow the US to send immigrants claiming asylum back to Mexico while their asylum case is being adjudicated in the US and to provide migrants with jobs, healthcare, and education. For its part, the United States agreed to speed up the adjudication process for asylum claims.

United States committed to expand the practice of returning migrants seeking asylum at the southern border to Mexico while their asylum case works its way through the courts.

Both countries also agreed to continue to cooperate on security concerns along their shared border and to address the underlying issues driving migrants to leave their homes in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

While the tariff threat appears to be lifted for now, the agreement leaves much to be desired. The White House has not specified if it will require additional appropriation from Congress to increase border security to implement the new agreement or if everything can be accomplished under current allocated funding.

Additionally, the process of sending migrants who crossed into the United States to claim asylum back to Mexico, known as Migrant Protection Protocols, may violate several laws. According to the Washington Post, federal judge blocked the controversial policy in April noting that it probably violated the Immigration Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedures Act.

Furthermore, President Trump may decide to use this tactic of essentially extorting Mexico to change its domestic policy by threatening massive and indiscriminate tariffs in the future if Mexico is unable to sufficiently stop the flow of migrants coming from Central America.

So while the immediate issue may have been resolved, the underlining problem President Trump’s willingness to break norms and use threats of a trade war continues to undermine the relationship between the Mexico and the United States.

Venezuelans in Brazil: Challenges of Protection

This article was written by João Carlos Jarochinski Silva and Liliana Lyra Jubilut and originally appeared on E-International Relations on July 12, 2018. It is reproduced here under CC BY-NC 4.0.

Since 2015, with the deepening of the crisis in Venezuela, and the consequent increase in displacement, with 5000 Venezuelans leaving their homes every day; Brazil has been receiving an unknown number of Venezuelans, with projected numbers reaching between 40,000 and 50000 of an estimated total of 1.6 million Venezuelans who have fled their country in 2017. Brazil, however, is not the sole destination of Venezuelans fleeing the profound crisis (which includes shortage of basic supplies, sky high inflation, insecurity, anti-democratic actions by the government, and, in some cases, specific political persecution to those opposed to Maduro’s regime) in their country. Data places Brazil as the 4th or 5th destination country for displaced Venezuelans in the South American region in terms of numbers, behind Colombia (the largest recipient), Peru and Chile; and, depending on the source, with fewer Venezuelans than Argentina. If one considers Latin America, Brazil falls to 7th, behind Mexico and Panama. Nonetheless, Brazil presents an interesting “case study” of the challenges of protection faced by forced displaced Venezuelans. On the one hand, it is possible to see in Brazil’s response to their arrival challenges in terms of legal protection, regarding their legal status, and even relating to the recognition of the Venezuelans as forced migrants in general, and, more specifically, as refugees. On the other hand, there are challenges in assuring their necessary protection, i.e. guaranteeing all their rights including human rights and access to them (Jubilut, Apolinário, 2008).

Legal Status and Consequent Challenges of Protection 

Brazil’s response to the migratory influx, in terms of legal status, has been confusing. On the one hand, there have been few recognitions of refugee status, even though there are over 32000 pending asylum requests and there is clear ground for recognition. This is so due to the fact that, as mentioned above, there are persons fleeing Venezuela due to an individual well-founded fear of persecution, either based on political opinion or belonging to a social group, and, therefore, they should be protected by the refugee regime as they meet the 1951 Convention on Refugee Status criteria. Moreover, Brazil also adopts the criterion of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees for the recognition of refugee status, accepting the fleeing from a gross and generalized violation of human rights scenario as a separate ground for recognition in its Refugee Act (Law 9.474/97). Refugee status, thus, should be applied to the Venezuelans seeking protection in Brazil. This seems also to be the recommended view of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as it has called States to treat Venezuelans as refugees, given that, even if not expressly calling for the recognition of their refugee status, the recommendation is to guarantee to them, for instance, access to safe territories, the protection of non-refoulement (i.e. not deport, expel or forcibly remove), residency, and the right to work. However, this has not been the position adopted by the Brazilian government, despite the fact that it has highlighted the Venezuelan crisis in international fora and championed its suspension of organizations, which shows that there are still degrees of discretion in the application of internationally recognized criteria for refugee status.

Notwithstanding the fact that there might be forced displaced Venezuelans that might not qualify for refugee status or that do not want to count with this form of international protection. Thus migration from Venezuela into Brazil should be regarded as, at least, a situation of a mixed migration flow, a complex migration situation in which, refugees and other migrants use the same channels and routes to access safe territories (IOM 2014, p. 63). The lack of recognition of this aspect of the Venezuelan migration highlights the difficulties of the Brazilian government to deal with mixed migration flows, and to guarantee the specific protection in migration provided for in international norms to which it has agreed to, thus not implementing adequate protection in face of particular needs and vulnerabilities (Jarochinski Silva, 2011; and Jarochinski Silva, Bógus, Silva, 2017, p. 15 – 30).

Brazil has preferred to recognize Venezuelans more broadly as (forced) migrants, and thus subject to the country’s internal rules on migration and without the guarantees of protection provided by the refugee regime, such as the above-mentioned protection of non-refoulement. The national regime on migration in Brazil has recently gone through a transformation, which meant that the more intense influx of Venezuelans into Brazil has been dealt with by two migration laws. Until November 2017, the regulating law was Law 6.815/80, known as the Aliens Statute, a legal norm adopted during the decades-long dictatorship in Brazil that focused mainly on national security. From November 2017 onwards, the applicable law has become Law 13.445/17, the Migration Law. The new law adopted a new paradigm in the governance of migration in Brazil, having human rights as one of its guidelines and principles (article 3, I).

Nonetheless, in terms of the legal status of Venezuelans little has changed in practice. This is so due to the fact that under Law 6.815/80, the National Council on Immigration (CNIg in Portuguese) has adopted Resolution 126 which allows the regularization of the legal status of Venezuelans in Brazil. This resolution was not specific to Venezuelans, but rather to all nationals of Brazil’s bordering countries. However, even though the resolution had a broader scope, Venezuelans made up almost the totality of requests for regularization under it, applying for regular status in massive numbers.

The new human rights logic proclaimed by Law 13.445/17 doesn’t seem to have impacted the way Brazil deals with the protection of Venezuelans. The sole modification after the new immigration regime was in place was the dropping of the demand that the immigrant had to have entered Brazil by its land borders (Ibid), brought along by a regulation of the Resolution, namely InterMinisterial Rule 9, which was still written from a perspective that sees immigrants in general as a threat (Jarochinski Silva, 2018). To those that meet the requirements of the specific regulation of this type of stay (i.e. the conditions laid down on InterMinisterial Rule 9) a 2-year authorization of legal stay is granted. Two months before the completion of the 2 years, it is possible to request permanent residency. This guarantees the same rights to the persons that choose this avenue of protection as all other immigrants living regularly in Brazil have. The regulation also allows for working in the country (article 5).

Law 13.445/17 brings the concept of “humanitarian hosting” both as one of its principles (article 3, VI) and as a basis for visas to Brazil (article 14, I, c). This type of visa can be granted to “stateless persons or nationals of any country facing grave situation or imminent institutional stability, armed conflict, calamity of great proportions, environmental disaster or grave violation of human rights or international humanitarian law, or in other hypotheses, as described in its regulation” (article 14, III, para. 3, free translation). However, this form of legal status has not had its practical requirements and processes defined yet, despite the fact that the regulation of the Law already exists (Decree 9.199/17). The practice of “humanitarian hosting” should allow for, besides regular legal stays in the country, a different status (as is the case of refugee status), given that the migrants vulnerability is implicitly recognized in this form of protection. It should also allow for the possibility of non-definitive returns to their country of origin, given that the Venezuelan flow, especially in the border between Brazil and Venezuela, has as one of its characteristics a strong context of remittances, not only of money but also of products, which, many times, are taken by the Venezuelans themselves to their country of origin. 

In light of this, and in terms of legal protection, one can say that, even though lacking in regards to the application of the refugee regime, Brazil has found pathways for a broad regularization of Venezuelans, with over 25000 persons counting with forms of legal stay apart from refugee status. This can be seen as positive as it does not increase the vulnerability of the migrants by way of not allowing them regular legal status in the country but it also has negative aspects as little attention is paid to specific needs. This scenario of protection gaps is also seen in terms of the Venezuelans’ integration in Brazil.

Integration and Challenges in Integral Protection 

A holistic approach to integration demands economic, social, and cultural rights guarantees and of access to said rights. Brazil, however, has not applied this approach to Venezuelan migrants. On the one hand, there has been a strong focus on the regularization of labour relations, i.e. a focus on getting them into the labour market. And on the other, there have been difficulties in their access to basic rights.

Venezuelans has been through the northern border of Brazil, located in the Legal Amazon, a region with low demographic density, poor quality in public services, and difficulties in connections with the rest of Brazil’s territory, given that, besides the long distances to the more populated areas of the country, there are few and expensive transport options (Jarochinski Silva, 2017). With the majority Venezuelans staying in the Legal Amazon, and concentrated in the state of Roraima (with the latest data pointing to 25000), their case has become one of “scape goats” in the regional level. State and municipal authorities have blamed the Venezuelans for the “collapse” of public services in their areas, in clear attempts to avoid any responsibilities. Besides, they have argued, tough not explicitly, that Venezuelans are not entitled to access the services that guarantee basic rights, in spite of the Brazilian Constitution guarantying universal access to health and to basic education, and the Brazilian legislation determines States and Cities competencies in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights.

These types of discourses have led to, on the one hand, the appearance of xenophobic actions(such as attacks to the shelters and houses where Venezuelans were living) as well as the idea of the arrival of immigrants in general as a threat (with news of “invasions” and the inflating of numbers, for instance), and, on the other hand, to requests of actions that fall away from International Law obligations, such as the closing of the borders.

Regional authorities also state that the responsibility for all matters related to refugees and other migrants falls with the federal government, which has limited capacity for direct action and sends funds to States and Cities to take care of these basic rights. The federal government option to assume a more direct action in dealing with the Venezuelans has been through the militarization of the protection and integration actions in its first stages. Notwithstanding the fact that this has led to the removal of some Venezuelans from extreme vulnerability, as for instance, leaving in the streets; it is not an approach founded on human rights and based on a social assistance grounded on the guarantee of rights and of dignity.

The federal government has also adopted a policy of “interiorization” of Venezuelans, which means their government-assisted relocation throughout the Brazilian territory. In this policy, the involved Ministries determine the new destinations by way of negotiations with other governmental authorities (from States and Cities), the destinies are presented to the refugees who chose to be transferred or not. And, even though the UN has supported the initiative, it is relevant to note that there is a gap in the participation of the civil society and of the business sector, which are fundamental and instrumental for the integration in the new destination and for the formal insertion in the labour market. So far, the interiorization process has led Venezuelans from Boa Vista (Roraima) to São Paulo (São Paulo), Cuiabá (MT), Manaus (Amazonas)Igarassu (Pernambuco), Conde (Paraíba) e Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro). It remains to be seen whether the interiorization will allow for better access to services and rights for the Venezuelans.


Brazil has undertaken several actions in relation to the Venezuelan displacement into its territory, however it should be pointed out that there is still the need for more to be done as well as for the improvement of actions and policies. Better legal protection and access to rights (i.e. integral protection) are needed. Most of the actions and policies seem to be reactive, i.e. to happen after the influx of the Venezuelans, as it has been in the past with both refugees and other migrants, which leads to hasty undertakings or the need for emergency actions. Brazil should keep in mind that the increase of forced displacement is a world phenomenon, that has been happening at least for the last 10 years and even more acutely in the last 5 years (UNHCR 2018, p. 4) and that tends to continue to augment in the future, as a way to increase its preparedness to deal with possible (and probable) influxes of refugees and other migrants. In the meantime, Brazil should look into its main international commitments and national values and constitutional pillars to find ways to better protect the Venezuelans that have come to its territory in seek of international protection.


Betts, Alexander. Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement. Ithaca, 2013.

Carneiro, Cyntia Soares. Venezuelanos recebem ajuda humanitária no BrasilJornal da USP(audio interview). 5 Jul. 2018.

Feline Freier, Luisa.  Understanding the Venezuelan Displacement CrisisE-International Relations. 28 Jun. 2018.

International Organization for Migration (IOM). Glossary of Migration. 2. ed. Geneva, 2014.

Jarochinski Silva, João Carlos. Uma análise sobre os fluxos migratórios mistos. In: RAMOS, André de Carvalho; Rodrigues, Gilberto; Almeida, Guilherme Assis de (Orgs.) 60 anos de ACNUR: perspectivas de futuro. São Paulo: Editora CL-A Cultural, p. 201- 220, 2011.

Jarochinski Silva, João Carlos; Bogus, Lucia Maria Machado; Silva, Stéfanie Angélica Gimenez Jarochinski. Os fluxos migratórios mistos e os entraves à proteção aos refugiados. 34 (1) Rev. bras. estud. popul., p. 15-30, 2017.

Jarochinski Silva, João Carlos. Migração forçada de venezuelanos pela fronteira norte do BrasilAnais do 41º Encontro Anual da Anpocs. Caxambu – MG, 2017.

Jarochinski Silva, João Carlos. Uma Política Migratória Reativa e Inadequada – A Migração Venezuelana Para o Brasil e a Resolução Nº. 126 do Conselho Nacional de Imigração (CNIg). In: Baeninger, Rosana et al (Org.) Migrações Sul-Sul. 2. ed. Campinas: Núcleo de Estudos de População “Elza Berquó” – Nepo/Unicamp, v. 1, p. 637-650, 2018.

Jubilut, Liliana Lyra. Refugee Protection in Brazil and Latin America – Selected Essays. London, 2018.

Jubilut, Liliana Lyra. Latin-America and Refugees: a panoramic viewVoelkerrechtsblog, 2016.

Jubilut, Liliana L.; Apolinário, Silvia M. O. S.  A população refugiada no Brasil: em busca da proteção integral. 6 (2) Universitas- Relações Internacionais, 2008.

Jubilut, Liliana L International Refugee Law and Protection in Brazil: a model in South America?, 19 Journal of Refugee Studies, p. 22-44, 2006.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2017. Geneva, 2018.

Páez Bravo, Tomás. La voz de la diáspora venezolana. Madrid: La Catarata, 2015.

Vedovato, Luiz Renato; Baeninger, Rosana. A distante regulamentação da acolhida humanitáriaJota, 1 Apr.  2018.

About the authors

João Carlos Jarochinski Silva has a PhD in Social Sciences (International Relations) from Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo and a Masters in International Law from Universidade Católica de Santos. He is a Professor at Universidade Federal de Roraima where he is the Coordinator of the International Relations course, the Vice-Coordinator of the Masters in Sociedade e Fronteiras, and a Member of the UNHCR Sergio Vieira de Mello Chair. He has been working with migration issues since his Master’s degree and actively involved in the assistance and research of the Venezuelans in Boa Vista.

Liliana Lyra Jubilut has a PhD and Master in International Law from Universidade de São Paulo and an LLM in International Legal Studies from NYU School of Law. She is a Professor at Universidade Católica de Santos, where she coordinates the research group “Direitos Humanos e Vulnerabilidades” and the UNHCR Sergio Vieira de Mello Chair. She has been part of national and international research projects and is a Member of IOM Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate. She has been working with refugees’ topics since 1999, having consulted for UNHCR and been a Lawyer/RSD and Protection Officer and an Outreach Protection Consultant at the Refugee Centre of Caritas Arquidiocesana de São Paulo.

This article was written by João Carlos Jarochinski Silva and Liliana Lyra Jubilut and originally appeared on E-International Relations on July 12, 2018. It is reproduced here under CC BY-NC 4.0.

Chile Unveils New “Democratic Responsibility Visa” for Venezuelans         

The economic depression in Venezuela is in its fourth year, and there appears to be little optimism for a recovery in the near future.

Although a fall in oil prices triggered the economic crisis, the recent recovery in global oil prices have done little to bring the economy back to life.

Further exacerbating the situation is rampant hyperinflation that makes routine business transactions, like purchasing groceries, nearly impossible with the bolívar.

Venezuela is also in the midst of a violent political crisis.

A year ago, President Nicolás Maduro took measures to remove any challenge to his party’s authority in government such as packing the courts with loyal supporters and replacing the opposition-controlled National Assembly with a substitute legislature, the National Constituent Assembly. This new legislative body is wholly controlled by his allies, including his wife, Cilia Flores.

The combination of economic catastrophe and political turmoil has led to a growing migration crisis with hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans have already fled their country. While Venezuela’s neighbors Colombia and Brazil have taken the majority of the migrants, other countries in South America are taking steps to alleviate some of the pressure.

Chile’s democratic responsibility visa

Chile announced last week that it would provide a so-called “democratic responsibility” visa to Venezuelans.

But for many Venezuelans, the costs involved in getting the visa are too high. As Philip Sanders and Noris Soto reported for Bloomberg,

“Venezuelans must apply for the visa at the Chilean consulates in Venezuela, with their passport. Many Venezuelans don’t have a passport and would need to pay fixers hundreds of dollars to get one. Moreover, according to a Foreign Office website, only one Chilean consulate in Venezuela can deal with visas, and that is in Caracas. At present, Venezuelans can use their identity cards to come to Chile, though they need a passport to obtain a work visa.”

However, these barriers did not stop a group of eager Venezuelans from gathering outside the Chilean consulate in Caracas and Balívar in the hopes of learning more about the new visa.

Looming migrant crisis

Presidential elections are scheduled to take place in Venezuela in one month. They are not expected to be free or fair and President Maduro will almost undoubtedly win in the official count. Many leaders in Latin America plus Canada and the United States announced that they will not recognize the results of the May elections.

Mass protests has been the common reaction to the sham elections that have recently taken place. The government typically responds to these demonstrations with violence. If this cycle repeats itself, then additional migration out of the country is likely to follow.

Visa programs like the Chilean democratic responsibility visa will alleviate some pressure for Venezuelans wanting to leave their country and who can afford to receive the visa. Ultimately such programs will do little should the nation of more than 30 million begin to collapse into internal conflict causing the rising flow of migrants to turn into a cascade.

President Trump Warns of a “Caravan” of Immigrants, Calls for Military Presence at Border

President Donald Trump is calling for the United States military to play an active role in guarding the US’s southern border with Mexico. This comes after Trump warned of a “caravan” of migrants from Central America traveling across Mexico towards the United States border.

According to CNN, Trump said that he spoke with Secretary of Defense James Mattis about doing “some things militarily.”

“Until we can have a wall and proper security, we’re going to be guarding our border with the military,” said President Trump.

According to CNN, the caravan is part of an annual event organized by Pueblo Sin Fronteras. Many of the migrants are escaping violence in their home countries, especially Honduras where violence followed last year’s contested presidential election.

There are more than 1,000 people migrating north as part of the caravan this year. NPR reports that one of the migrants in the caravan was a member of the opposition in the Honduran legislature.

President Trump sent out a multiday tweet storm starting on Easter Sunday with an attacked his Democratic opponents of hindering the efforts of the Border Patrol. He urged his Republican colleagues in the Senate to use the “Nuclear Option” by which he means an end to the filibuster which allows a minority of Senators to block legislation.

The next day, Trump took aim at Mexico and Honduras. In a rambling tweet, the President called on Mexico to halt the group of migrants before they reached the US-Mexico border.

In an early morning tweet on Tuesday, Trump threatened economic retaliation against Mexico, Honduras and “the countries that allow this to happen” if the caravan wasn’t stopped before it reached the United States.

The United States is currently renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada. Trump was very hawkish on NAFTA during the presidential campaign. After becoming president, Trump called for the near quarter-century old free trade agreement to be renegotiated.

Recently, his administration has threatened to cut off aid funding to countries that do not follow the US on the international stage. According to the Department of State, the United States plans to provide $65,750,000 to Honduras in fiscal year 2019.

Indigenous Warao Fleeing Venezuela Face Challenges in Brazil

The economic crisis in Venezuela has forced thousands to leave the struggling South American country in what has become a migration crisis. The exodus has caused particular strain for Venezuela’s neighbors, Colombia and Brazil.

While most migrants continue to face difficulties after they leave Venezuela, some face greater challenges than others.

Peter Prengaman reports for the Associated Press from the town of Pacaraima in the northern Brazilian state of Roraima on challenges faced by the indigenous Warao people.

The Warao people number in the tens of thousands and traditionally inhabit the Orinoco River delta area in Venezuela.

While conditions in Brazil are certainly better than in Venezuela, the Warao migrants find themselves in a concerning situation. Prengaman reports that upwards of 500 Warao men, women, and children sleep on hammocks or the concrete floor in a repurposed warehouse designed for 250 people in Pacaraima.

“Traditionally poor and marginalized in Venezuela, the Warao are arriving with even more health problems than other Venezuelans,” writes Prengaman. “Those health needs, combined with cultural and linguistic differences, mean authorities have no choice but to set up shelters just for them — and hope they can return to their home lands in Venezuela as integrating them into Brazilian society doesn’t appear realistic.”

Luis Fernando Pere, a lead volunteer with Fraternity International Humanitarian Federation, described the situation of Venezuelan migrants as “precarious,” but added, “The Warao are arriving in even worse shape.”

Language, cultural, and prejudicial barriers separate the Warao from other migrants from Venezuela and the local Brazilians. Warao described being turned away from work, while local residents describe frustration with Warao beggers.

The federal government is discussing possible plans to deal with the Warao migrants, including the establishment of a “base of support” administered by the army. The National Indian Foundation is meeting with Warao leaders and local indigenous groups in Roraima. However, details of any such plan are vague and Prengaman reports that his emails and calls were not answered.

Venezuelan Migration Crisis Grows

The economic crisis in Venezuela has become a migration crisis. In the last two years, nearly one million Venezuelans emigrated as their country’s economy fell. The Washington Post reports on how Venezuela’s neighbors are dealing with influxes of migrants and how the crisis resembles the European migrant crisis.

“The massive scale of the exodus is being compared to the flow of Syrians into Western Europe in 2015. And, just as in that crisis, countries overwhelmed by the flood of new arrivals are beginning to bar their doors.”

However, a major difference between the migrants fleeing the two migrant crisis is the status of the migrants as the Washington Post article points out.

“Jozef Merkx, representative for the U.N. high commissioner for refugees in Colombia, said the agency is concerned about the operations. But because Venezuela is not at war, its people are harder to classify as refugees in need of international protection.”


President MichelTemer recently declared a state of emergency after visiting a border state in northern Brazil. His government has pledged $20 million and a new field hospital to help handle the situation. However, the government in Brasilia is also moving to control the border.

Officials say they will treat the newcomers as Brazilian citizens. But Temer also vowed to double the number of troops at the border.”


Colombia has borne the brunt of the recent waves of migrants. Venezuela borders Brazil, Colombia, and Guyana. However, economics and geography have pushed most Venezuelans to cross the western border with Colombia.

Since August 250,000 Venezuelans have migrated to Colombia. This peaked in December when 90,000 people crossed the border in a single day. Currently, 3,000 Venezuelans are crossing into Colombia daily.

The sheer numbers have led to a backlash in Colombian cities and towns, prompting the national government last month to suspend the issuance of temporary visas for Venezuelans. Colombian authorities are now launching operations in which dozens of Venezuelans a day are captured and expelled.”

There does not seem to be any reason to suspect that migration flows from will slow on their own. The International Monetary Fund forecasts Venezuela’s economy to continue to shrink and President Maduro does not appear to be willing to take drastic steps to reduce the suffering in his country.

La Nueva Prohibición del Viaje de Trump Apunta a Algunos Funcionarios de Gobierno Venezolanos

El domingo, el presidente Donald Trump anunció una nueva proclamación que impondrá restricciones de viaje a los extranjeros que buscan viajar a Estados Unidos. Esta prohibición de viaje revisada afectará a ciudadanos de ocho países, incluyendo Chad, Irán, Líbia, Corea del Norte, Somalia, Siria, Venezuela y Yemen.

El Presidente Trump declara en la proclamación que las restricciones fueron colocadas en estos ocho países porque sus gobiernos son incapaces de proporcionar satisfactoriamente una “información de base” necesaria para “confirmar la identidad de las personas que buscan ingresar a los Estados Unidos como inmigrantes y no inmigrantes como individuos que solicitan cualquier otro beneficio bajo las leyes de inmigración, y para evaluar si son una amenaza de seguridad o de seguridad pública”.

A diferencia de los otros siete países, las nuevas restricciones no suspenden la inmigración para todos los venezolanos. Por el contrario, la proclamación del presidente Trump sólo suspende las visas de negocios y turismo para “funcionarios de agencias gubernamentales de Venezuela involucrados en procedimientos de selección y de verificación … y sus familiares inmediatos”.

Las restricciones de viaje a funcionarios del gobierno venezolano vienen después de que el gobierno de Trump impuso nuevas sanciones a ciertos miembros del régimen del presidente venezolano Nicolás Maduro, incluido el propio Maduro.

Es probable que la proclama del Presidente enfrente un desafío en los tribunales. La Corte Suprema tendrá audiencia oral el 10 de octubre en dos casos relacionados con las anteriores prohibiciones de Trump. La orden ejecutiva original prohibió temporalmente a todos los ciudadanos de siete países de mayoría musulmana de viajar a los Estados Unidos, pero los tribunales no pudieron aplicarlos plenamente.

Las nuevas restricciones de viaje entrarán en vigor el 18 de octubre.

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